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Abstract—Social engineering attacks are well known attacks in 
the cyberspace and relatively easy to try and implement because 
no technical knowledge is required. In various online 
environments such as business domains where customers talk 
through a chat service with employees or in social networks 
potential hackers can try to manipulate other people by employing 
social attacks against them to gain information that will benefit 
them in future attacks. Thus, we have used a number of natural 
language processing steps and a machine learning algorithm to 
identify potential attacks. The proposed method has been tested 
on a semi-synthetic dataset and it is shown to be both practical and 
effective. 
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security, Natural language processing, Machine Learning 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Social engineering attacks are based on human weaknesses or 
the lack of knowledge about them, thus specific technical 
knowledge is not required from the side of the attacker. That’s 
the main reason why these types of attacks are highly employed 
and are attractive to applied to others. In the past there were 
various approaches arguing theoretically that social engineering 
detection is important [1-4]. Apart from those there are some 
practical works based on natural language processing (NLP) and 
machine learning, including neural networks [5-6]. It is also 
important to mention the important role that psychology plays 
in social engineering attacks and the part that it plays in NLP 
when software needs to be developed to detect attacks. 
 
There are different online environments such as business 
domains where customers talk to employees through online chat 
and in social networking where people talk to each other which 
are considered very attractive to apply social engineering 
attacks. There are research approaches that consider attacks in 
such domains and apply NLP and machine learning to detect 
attack successfully to an extent [5-6]. To detect attacks written 
in human language such as English pre-processing of the 
dialogue is necessary using a parser such as the Stanford core 
NLP [7]. By using such a library then a classification dataset can 
be created, and a classifier applied. This paper builds on top of 
the algorithm found in [6]. The proposed method is based on the 
12 steps of the SEADer++ algorithm which are also explained 
in section 3 and 2 more pre-processing steps are added to 
improve the quality of the output as shown in the evaluation 
section. 
 
This paper delivers the following contributions: 
1. A method for detecting social engineering attacks is 
proposed. 
2. The proposed method has been evaluated using a semi-
synthetic dataset and the results show that it is both 
practical and effective. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is the 
related work, section 3 describes the proposed method, section 
4 explains the experimental evaluation and section 5 contains 
the conclusions. 
II. RELATED WORK 
One of the first works in social engineering attack detection is 
the one in ref [8]. The research in this work is based on real time 
telephone systems and focused on the identification on voice 
signatures of repeated voice calls and a proof of concept was 
developed to identify the attacks in the dialogues dataset. One 
more recent work is the one in ref [4] where the authors 
identified questions requesting private information manually 
using a small database of verb-noun pairs. This work extended 
by [2] where the authors identified 4 attack vectors: the urgency 
of the dialog, negative commands and questions, whether the 
message is likely automated identified by a generic greeting and 
then check the URL and generated a topic blacklist using the 
Naïve Bayes classifier. Other proposed solutions such as [1] 
and [9] use complex state machines to map pathways that can 
be followed in order to mitigate an attack. The work in [3] is 
good in terms of a small survey on social engineering attacks 
by providing a relatively comprehensive background on them 
and on potential solutions. In [10] the authors provide an 
approach based on semantics of dialogues to detect social 
engineering attacks. The authors in [11] shown that humans are 
the weakest link in social engineering attacks and their study 
shows results that proves that. In [12] and [13] the authors 
provided theoretical work that can be potentially used to 
implement real systems. The authors of [14] give a good 
explanation of how social engineering attacks can be detected 
whereas in [15] and [16] different attack scenarios are 
delivered. More practical works include the ones in [5] and [6] 
where the authors use NLP and machine learning to detect 
attacks successfully.  
 
In addition to that there are other works that can be useful such 
as the one in [17] where the authors performed influence 
analysis on the quality of knowledge in a collective. The one in 
[18] a neural network is used with harmony for searching and 
the one in [19] where nature inspired optimization is discussed. 
In [20] an Island-based cuckoo search algorithm with highly 
disruptive polynomial mutation has been proposed. 
 
III. PROPOSED METHOD 
There are several steps that need to be completed in the 
proposed method. Initially, the text is read using natural 
language processing and then is being processed into a 
classification dataset. At the last step a classifier such as 
Random Forest, Multi-Layer perceptron or others can be 
applied to see which entry is an attack or not. The python 
programming language has been used for all step along with the 
SymSpellpy library for spelling errors, the Web of Trust (WOT) 
to check if a link is malicious or not  
 
The proposed method consists of several steps to preprocess the 
dialogs into a dataset for classification. The last steps are 
applying the classifier.  All the steps explained below, have 
been written in the Python programming language. The 
SymSpellpy library (a Python port of SymSpell) was used for 
spelling, the Web of Trust (WOT) Application Programming 
Interface (API) was used to check any links. the SciKit library 
for the classifiers and the Gensim Latent Dirichlet Allocation 
(LDA) model was used for the estimation of topics for the 
dialogs. 
 
Steps 1 to 5 are applied to check if links are malicious, steps 6 
and 7 determine quality of the spelling, and steps 8 to 11 
determine the intention and a pre-defined blacklist is used for 
this. Feature scoring can be given by: Link score, 𝑆!, Spelling 
score, 𝑆"#, and Intent score, 𝑆$. Each score is scaled down to a 
value between 0 and 1. After the pre-processing of the 
dialogues (steps 1 – 11), the classification dataset has the 
following 4 labels: (1) Intent, (2) Spelling, (3) Link (4) XXX 
(5) XXX (6) XXX and (7) attack or no attack. The final steps 
use these as inputs for any classifier.  
 
The steps of the proposed method are as follows: 
 
1. URLs from a dialog are extracted text using a regex 
pattern matcher.  
2. If the text contains URLs, the link(s) is sent to the 
WOT to check if it is malicious. 
3. The WOT then returns a reputation value between 0 
and 100 of the sites, the confidence of the given 
reputation between 0-100 is also returned and the 1 out 
of 17 identifying categories that identify the nature of 
the website is also returned. The broad categories and 
example subcategories are as follows:  
• 1XX Negative (101 Malware, 103 Phishing, 
104 Scam, 105 Potentially illegal etc.)  
• 2XX Questionable (201 Misleading claims or 
unethical, 205 spam, 207 ads / popups etc.) 
• 3XX Neutral (301 Online tracking, 302 
controversial, 303 political etc.) 
• 5XX Positive (501 A good site) 
4. If the returned category is of group 1XX or 2XX, then 𝑆! = 1. 
5. Otherwise, divide the reputation by 100 and take it 
away from 1 as shown in equation 1. 
 𝑆! = 1 −	𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒100  (1) 
  
 
6. At this step the SymSpellpy library is used to check 
for spelling. 
 
7. The number of misspelled words is determined and is 
given by 𝑥. This number is then converted between 0 
and 1 by utilizing Equation 2. The value of 𝑆%& is the 
spelling quality, where values that are high represent 
poorer spelling. An exponential function is used 
instead of a linear one to rate a higher number of 
spelling mistakes. To adjust the rate at which the score 
tends towards 1, the constant 𝑎 can be varied to affect 
how you want to punish spelling errors. After a series 
of testing it was identified that 0.5 allowed the text to 
contain a small number of mistakes without creating a 
score of a high value. For example, if 𝑎 is set to 0.5 
and 𝑥	 = 	1  then 𝑆%&  = 0.39, if 𝑥	 = 	5  then 𝑆%& =	0.92.  
 
 𝑆%& =	1 − 𝑒'() (2) 
 
 
8. At this step the corrected spelling of the dialog is used, 
and it is checked against a blacklist, derived from 
security policy dictionary of 48 words. This can be 
populated easily with environmental or company 
related words such as: passwords, credentials, 
database and others. The number of blacklist matched 
words is given by 𝑀*. 
9. At this step the algorithm checks for intent verbs and 
adjectives such as must, need, urgent and others. This 
value is given by 𝑀$ 
10. To tune the results, values 𝑀*	and 𝑀$ are multiplied 
by the weights 𝑊* and 𝑊$, weighted at values of 2 and 
1 retrospectively. This was added as an equation in 
case it is necessary to change the weight of this step, 
if it is considered important compared to others. The 
value 𝑥 can be given by equation 3. 
 
 𝑥 = (𝑀* ×𝑊*) + (𝑀$ ×𝑊$)	 (3) 
 
 
11. At this step, the value of 𝑥  is normalized using 
equation 4, by applying the same exponential function 
as step 7 (equation 2). Where 𝑎 = 0.4 to give the best 
output. A higher value of 𝑆$  indicates a higher 
concentration of blacklisted words in the text.  
 
 𝑆$ =	1 − 𝑒'()	 (4) 
 
12. Then, the original dialogue dataset is checked to 
identify which dialogue was indeed an attack and 
assign the true (1) or false (0) value to the new 
classification column in the dataset. 
 
13. The LDA probabilistic generative model is used to 
infer the topic structure, β. The number of topics are 
represented by β1:K , where each βk  is the distribution 
over the vocabulary. The topic proportions for any 
given document is given by θd.  The assigned topics are 
zd where zd,n is the topic assignment for the nth word in 
the document, d. The observed words for document d 
are given by wd . The generative model showing the 
hidden and observed variables in the LDA can be seen 
in Equation 5 [21].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. LDA generative process 
 
 
14. The inference method to determine the distribution of 
the topic structure given the observed documents 
(posterior), is given in Equation 6. 
 𝑝(𝛽+:- , 𝜃+:., 𝑧+:., 𝑤+:.)(𝑝(𝑤+:.) (6) 
 
 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
For the experimental evaluation we have used a real dataset and 
the accuracy, precision and area under the curve metrics.  
The dataset consists of 1,051 entries and was originally derived 
from social engineering dialogues as described in [8] and was 
later extended and used in [6]. The extended dataset from [6] 
was used which has 4 columns: 
1. Intent 
2. Spelling 
3. Link 
4. Attack or not 
 
This dataset was based on the dialogues from [8] and then the 
preprocessing steps 1 to 12 were applied to create it. Then, steps 
13 and 14 were applied and 3 more columns were created in the 
classification dataset which now has the following 7 columns: 
 
1. Intent 
2. Spelling 
3. Link 
4. Topic modeling 
5. Topic modeling 
6. Topic modeling 
7. Attack or not 
 
𝑝(𝐷|𝛼, 𝛽) = 	D𝑝(𝛽/)D𝑝(Ѳ0).01+-/1+ D𝑝F𝑧0,3	GѲ0H𝑝F𝑤0,3	G𝛽+:- , 	𝑧0,3)431+  (5) 
4, 5 and 6 represent 3 topics that the dialogue(s) is based on and 
how close is to each topic (value between 0 and 1). The dataset 
is available online1.  
 
To evaluate the quality of the algorithm the accuracy, precision 
and area under the roc curve (AUC) metrics have been used. 
Accuracy is defined in equation 7 and Precision is defined in 
equation 8. TP stands for true positives, TN for true negatives, 
FP for false positives and FN for false negatives. All executions 
are based on a 5-fold cross validation approach using the 
Python programming language and the Scikit library. 
 
 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 = 𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 (7) 
 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 (8) 
 
The accuracy results of the proposed method are presented in 
table 1 and it is shown the random forest classifier is better 
when compared to the MLP and K nearest neighbor (KNN). In 
table 2 the Precision results are presented which show again that 
the random forest classifier is better. Each algorithm was 
executed 5 times and at the end the average value of these 5 
times is presented. 
TABLE I.  ACCURACY RESULTS 
EXECUTION RANDOM 
FOREST 
MLP KNN 
1 0.796 0.777 0.791 
2 0.787 0.779 0.763 
3 0.784 0.782 0.781 
4 0.794 0.773 0.779 
5 0.795 0.764 0.759 
AVERAGE 0.791 0.775 0.774 
 
TABLE II.  PRECISION  RESULTS 
EXECUTION RANDOM 
FOREST 
MLP KNN 
 
1 https://github.com/npolatidis/SEADer-v2 
1 0.783 0.781 0.775 
2 0.807 0.764 0.773 
3 0.781 0.772 0.774 
4 0.796 0.778 0.751 
5 0.783 0.777 0.805 
AVERAGE 0.790 0.774 0.775 
 
Having seen now that the random forest classifier behaves 
better for this dataset, figure 2 presents an accuracy comparison 
between 10 and 100 estimators for the random forest classifier 
and figure 3 similarly presents a precision comparison. The 
results show that having 100 estimators is slightly better 
compared to having 10. The average accuracy for 10 is 79.2% 
and for 100 is 80.1 while the average precision for 10 if 79.4% 
and for 100 is 79.7%. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Accuracy comparison results for random forest 
 
 
Fig. 3. Precision comparison results for random forest 
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Figure 4 presents an accuracy comparison between the 
proposed method and SEADer++ [6] both for the same dataset 
and using a random forest classifier, while a precision 
comparison is shown in figure 5. The proposed method 
achieves 80.1% accuracy while SEADer++ achieves 78.4% and 
in terms of precision the proposed method achieves 79.7% 
compared to 80.1%. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Accuracy comparison 
 
 
Fig. 5. Percision comparison 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the area under the curve results for which the 
average of the proposed method is 89.2% and for SEADer++ is 
81.6%. 
 
 
Fig. 6. AUC comparison 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we presented a social engineering attack detection 
method that is based on NLP and machine learning. The 
proposed method has been evaluated using a semi-synthetic 
dataset and well-known metrics along with a comparison to a 
state-of-the-art alternative method. It has been shown that it 
performs well and outperforms the alternative methodology.  
 
In the future we aim to explore how the use of fuzzy logic 
techniques with machine learning algorithms can improve 
detection quality. 
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